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Sexual conflict and the tragedy of the commons
Abstract
It is widely understood that the costs and benefits of mating can affect the fecundity and survival of
individuals. Sexual conflict may have profound consequences for populations, due to the negative
effects it causes males and females to have on one another's fitness. Here we present a model describing
the evolution of sexual conflict, in which males inflict a direct cost on female fitness. We show that
these costs can drive the entire population to extinction. To males, females are an essential, but finite,
resource over which they have to compete. Population extinction owing to sexual conflict can therefore
be seen as an evolutionary ‘tragedy of the commons'. Our model shows that a positive feedback between
harassment and the operational sex ratio is responsible for the demise of females, and thus for
population extinction. We further show that the evolution of female resistance to counter harassment can
prevent a tragedy of the commons. Our findings not only demonstrate that sexual conflict can drive a
population extinct, but also highlight how simple mechanisms, such as harassment costs to males and
females and the coevolution between harassment and resistance, can help avert a tragedy of the
commons caused by sexual conflict.
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Abstract 
It is widely understood that the costs and benefits of mating can affect the fecundity 
and survival of individuals. Sexual conflict may have profound consequences for 
populations, due to the negative effects it causes males and females to have on one 
another’s fitness. Here we present a model describing the evolution of sexual conflict, 
in which males inflict a direct cost on female fitness. We show that these costs can 
drive the entire population to extinction. To males, females are an essential, but finite, 
resource over which they have to compete. Population extinction owing to sexual 
conflict can therefore be seen as an evolutionary ‘tragedy of the commons’. Our 
model shows that a positive feedback between harassment and the operational sex 
ratio is responsible for the demise of females, and thus for population extinction. We 
further show that the evolution of female resistance to counter harassment can prevent 
a tragedy of the commons. Our findings not only demonstrate that sexual conflict can 
drive a population extinct, but also highlight how simple mechanisms, such as 
harassment costs to males and females and the coevolution between harassment and 
resistance, can help avert a tragedy of the commons caused by sexual conflict. 
Keywords: adaptive dynamics, population dynamics, coevolution, social evolution, 
evolutionary suicide 
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Introduction 
Sexual reproduction is widely considered an evolutionary mystery, because it 
involves a twofold cost. This cost is a result of anisogamy and is due to the production 
of males halving the population growth rate (West et al. 1999; Agrawal 2006). Under 
anisogamy, one of the sexes evolves to produce small gametes that contribute 
virtually no resources to the zygote. The shift from investing in few gametes to 
producing numerous gametes (which is a specialty of the male sex) represents 
escalating competition between males. The cost of sex only arises when males shift 
resource use away from offspring provisioning, and it is thus often remarked that the 
twofold cost of sex is more appropriately referred to as the cost of male production 
(Maynard Smith 1978; Jennions and Kokko 2010). 
 
This twofold cost is key to understanding the evolution of sexual reproduction, but it 
also has other consequences. For males, females form the limiting resource. 
Numerous male traits, such as sperm competition, have evolved as a consequence of 
competition among males, which can lead to male gametes vastly outnumbering 
female gametes, or to investment in weaponry (Emlen 2008). Such scenarios can lead 
to a “tragedy of the commons”, as behaviors are favored that are advantageous to 
individuals, but detrimental to the group or population as a whole (Hardin 1968; 
Rankin et al. 2007a). Sexual conflict over mating is a tragedy of the commons 
whenever male-male competition reduces the availability of females (or their 
gametes) for all males, e.g. via elevated female mortality (Le Galliard et al. 2005; 
Rankin and Kokko 2006). Given the increasing emphasis in the evolutionary literature 
on understanding the demographic consequences of group-detrimental behaviors 
using the framework of the tragedy of the commons (e.g. Rankin et al. 2007a; Frank 
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2010), it is surprising that sexual conflict has not featured more strongly in such work: 
so far, we have virtually no theoretical background for understanding the potentially 
negative population-level consequences of male behaviors towards females. 
 
If male behavior harms female reproduction, the cost of sex can be larger than 
twofold. Studies of sexual conflict have documented numerous examples of 
reproductive costs (Chapman et al. 2003; Arnqvist and Rowe 2005). Extreme cases 
include toxic seminal fluids that appear to harm females as a form of ‘collateral 
damage’ (Chapman et al. 1995; Wigby and Chapman 2005), as well as male mating 
behaviors that physically damage females (Le Galliard et al. 2005). Milder cases, 
which nevertheless can increase the cost of sex, include size dimorphisms that force 
mothers to invest more energy into male offspring (Rankin and Kokko 2007). Also 
sexual harassment of females by males has been shown to impose costs on females, in 
terms of reduced fecundity or survival, in a number of systems (e.g. Réale et al. 1996; 
Crudgington and Siva-Jothy 2000; Shine et al. 2000; Shine et al. 2001; Maklakov et 
al. 2006; Rönn et al. 2006; Rönn et al. 2007; Godsen and Svensson 2009). A recent 
study of water striders demonstrated that, while aggressive males had an advantage in 
local competition for mates, this had a negative impact on their fitness when 
considered across a wider metapopulation, due to the harm they imposed on females 
(Eldakar et al. 2009). 
 
The population-level consequences of sexual conflict, albeit rarely documented, can 
be severe (Kokko and Brooks 2003; Le Galliard et al. 2005; Valero et al. 2008), but 
typically depend on both the population density and sex ratio. For example, in the 
common lizard Lacerta vivipara, males harm females by inflicting mating scars and 
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damaging the skin on the backs of females (Le Galliard et al. 2005). Male-biased 
populations of these lizards have been shown to exhibit higher female mortality than 
female-biased populations, owing to a higher level of harassment of females by males 
(Le Galliard et al. 2005). The harm induced by male lizards was predicted to drive 
populations extinct within 40 years, if they started out with a male bias (Le Galliard et 
al. 2005). This highlights that the ‘tragedy’ does not have to stop at a 50% reduction 
in population growth rate, which would be predicted if the cost of sex were always 
precisely twofold. Instead, individually selected adaptations can lead to detrimental 
effects up to the point at which a whole population or species is driven to extinction 
(Matsuda and Abrams 1994a; Matsuda and Abrams 1994b; Boots and Sasaki 2003; 
Parvinen 2005; Rankin and López-Sepulcre 2005; Rankin et al. 2010).  
 
Given that sexual conflict among animals is widespread (Arnqvist and Rowe 2005), 
the population-level cost of sex could often be greater than twofold. If sexual conflict 
elevates female mortality and becomes more severe when populations are male-
biased, what prevents sexual conflict from regularly driving populations extinct? We 
investigate two potential mechanisms that may avert a tragedy of the commons: (1) 
costs to males of harassing females (as such direct costs are known to prevent a 
tragedy of the commons in other situations – Rankin et al. 2007a) and (2) joint 
evolution between male harassment and female resistance (Arnqvist and Rowe 2002; 
Rönn et al. 2007). We do this by building a model based on adaptive dynamics theory 
that separately treats the evolution of phenotypic traits in males and females and does 
not make any specific assumptions about the underlying genetic system, such as 
diploidy or additive genetics. To evaluate the robustness of our results, and to see how 
they might be influenced by explicit genetic assumptions, we further analyze a 
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corresponding individual-based model. We show that costs of harassment and the 
underlying population ecology are key determinants of whether populations can be 
driven extinct by sexual conflict. 
 
Model and Results 
Evolving Traits 
We examine the evolution of male harassment of females and of female resistance to 
male-induced harm, both of which are sex-specific. Males express a harassment level 
y that improves male mating success, but reduces survival for males as well as 
females. We denote the corresponding costs by g and h for males and females, 
respectively. Such costs may be of very unequal magnitude for the harasser and the 
target of harassment. Females express a level of resistance x (0!x!1) that improves 
their survival, but simultaneously reduces their fecundity by a factor p(x) (0!p(x)!1). 
A description of the variables and parameters used in the model is given in Table 1. 
 
Population Dynamics 
Since our model links trait evolution with its demographic consequences, we must 
specify population dynamics explicitly. To do this, we assume that the population 
dynamics of males and females unfold in continuous time. Male density is denoted by 
M and female density by F. We assume that reproduction takes negligible time, so all 
males and females can mate at any time, and the operational sex ratio (OSR) is the 
same as the adult sex ratio. Females have an intrinsic birth rate b and produce males 
with probability r and females with probability 1–r (if r=1/2, the primary sex ratio is 
even). 
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To capture the assumed demographic consequences of the traits x and y as described 
above, we consider the following population dynamics of male and female densities: 
 
 dF/dt=(1–r)p(x)bF – h(x,y,M,F)F – l(M,F)F , (1a) 
 dM/dt=rp(x)bF – g(y)M – l(M,F)M . (1b) 
 
In these equations, density-dependent mortality is represented by the function l(M,F). 
For simplicity, we assume logistic density dependence, such that l(M,F) increases 
linearly with population density, l(M,F)=µ(M+F), where the parameter µ scales the 
density-dependent mortality. In keeping with adaptive dynamics theory, we assume a 
homogeneous population such that all males and females (except for the occasional 
rare mutant) have the same trait values x and y, respectively (we later relax this 
assumption in an individual-based model). 
 
We assume that a male’s investment y in harassment imposes a cost on the male by 
elevating his mortality in proportion to y. We describe this by the function g(y)=cy, 
where c scales these costs to males. Similarly, male harassment increases female 
mortality, which is described by the function h(x,y,M,F). We derive our examples 
below using the function h(x,y,M,F)=(1–dx)yM/F, which implies that the harassment 
costs experienced by females decrease with female resistance and increase as males 
become more common relative to females. The first effect is described by 1–dx, 
where d scales the efficiency of female resistance. As h cannot be negative, we 
assume that 0!d!1 (implying that 0!1–dx!1). The second effect is described by 
kyM/F, where k scales how strongly harassment increases female mortality. As female 
resistance x may impose a cost on females, we assume that female fecundity is 
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reduced by the factor p(x)=1–ax, where a scales a female’s cost of investing in 
resistance (0!a!1). This fecundity cost can be large, as in the case of bedbugs 
developing a harder outer shell (Reinhardt et al. 2003), or small, as in the case of 
females kicking to avoid copulation in the seed beetle Callosobruchus maculatus 
(Edvardsson and Tregenza 2005). 
 
Extinction Threshold 
There are three equilibria of the dynamics described by equations (1): the first is the 
extinction equilibrium at =0 and =0, whereas male and female densities are 
positive at the other two equilibria. Calculating the Jacobian matrix of equation (1) 
and determining its eigenvalues, we see that only one of the two non-extinction 
equilibria is stable, and we therefore focus on this equilibrium in the following 
analyses. Examining the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at =0 and =0 yields 
a threshold condition for the levels of male harassment y that cause extinction, 
 
 
 
y ! yext = bp(x)
2 rk(1" dx) rk(1" dx) " c(1" r)( ) + 2rk(1" dx) " c(1" r)
c2
 . (2) 
 
For r>c/(c+k(1–dx)), the extinction threshold  is real and positive, and for x=0, it 
simplifies to 
 
yext = b 2 rk[rk ! c(1! r)] + 2rk ! c(1! r)( ) / c2 . 
 
We note in passing that, had we assumed density-dependent harassment, 
h(x,y,M,F)=(1–dx)kyM, instead of frequency-dependent harassment, h(x,y,M,F)=(1–
dx)kyM/F, deterministic extinction would not be possible. This finding is consistent 
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with analogous results for parasite-mediated extinction, where it has been shown that 
deterministic extinction can only occur under frequency-dependent transmission and 
not under density-dependent transmission (e.g. Boots and Sasaki 2003; Rankin et al. 
2010). 
 
Evolution of Male Harassment 
We now investigate whether evolution drives the harassment level y above the 
extinction threshold . For our first model, we use adaptive dynamics theory (Metz 
et al. 1992; Dieckmann and Law 1996; Metz et al. 1996; Dieckmann 1997; Geritz et 
al. 1998; Meszéna et al. 2001; Dieckmann and Metz 2006) to account for the eco-
evolutionary feedback between the population dynamics and the evolution of our two 
evolving traits. As such, our analysis assumes that ecological and evolutionary 
timescales are sufficiently separated (so that the densities of males and females 
rapidly reach equilibrium). We do not distinguish between genotypes and phenotypes, 
and the terms “mutants” and “residents” refer, respectively, to individuals with rare or 
prevalent trait values. Since our results in equations (3) to (10) are based on selection 
gradients, equivalent results could be derived if we had instead followed the 
quantitative genetics method of Lande (Lande 1976; Iwasa et al. 1991), with 
uncorrelated traits and small additive genetic variances. 
 
We assume that harassment at level y provides a male with an absolute mating benefit 
f(y). However, since mating opportunities are limited by the availability of females, a 
male’s mating success must be evaluated relative to that of all other males: this 
implies that selection on y is frequency-dependent, as a male’s mating success 
depends not only on his own f(y), but also on the f(y) of other males. In a first step of 
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analysis, we assume that females possess no resistance (i.e., x=0, and thus p(x)=1). 
The invasion fitness (Metz et al. 1992) of a mutant male with trait value y' in a 
population dominated by the resident trait values x and y is given by the mutant’s per 
capita growth rate when rare: 
 
  . (3) 
 
The factor  f ( !y ) / f ( y)  represents the relative benefits of mating to a male investing 
y' in harassment. In a homogeneous population (where y'=y), this term equals 1. We 
derive our examples below using the function f(y)=yu, so the shape of the dependence 
of the mating benefit f(y) on the harassment level y is determined by u. If u>1, the 
benefits of harassment are accelerating, while if u<1 these benefits are decelerating. 
 
The selection gradient for the male harassment level y is 
 
  . (4) 
 
The selection pressure on y vanishes at the evolutionarily singular strategy y*, which 
is thus obtained by solving the equation sM(y*)=0, 
 
 y* = bu c 1! r( ) ! kruc2 1! u( )  . (5) 
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If the singular strategy y=y* satisfies inequality (2), the evolution of harassment 
causes population extinction through sexual conflict when y! . Such selection-
driven extinction is known as evolutionary suicide (Ferrière 2000; Dieckmann and 
Ferrière 2004; Parvinen 2005; Rankin and López-Sepulcre 2005). Fig. 1 shows an 
example of the evolutionary dynamics of male harassment, including its effect on 
male and female densities. The evolutionary dynamics of y are determined by the 
equation dy/dt=!sM(y), where ! is a small number that scales the speed of evolution 
(Lande 1976; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1990; Iwasa et al. 1991; had we used the 
canonical equation of adaptive dynamics, Dieckmann and Law 1996, the right-hand 
side would also contain ). Fig. 1A and 1B show a case in which the population 
persists despite the evolutionary aggravation of sexual conflict. Here the number of 
females exceeds the number of males, but the population is not driven extinct, since 
the per capita harassment experienced by females remains mild despite the high level 
of harassment imposed by each male. In contrast, fig. 1C and 1D show a case in 
which the population is driven extinct. Here the level of male harassment remains 
relatively low, but since the population contains many more males than females, the 
positive feedback between the declining fraction of females and the increasing 
harassment they experience causes extinction. 
 
By replacing the y in inequality (2) for x=0 with y=y* according to equation (5), we 
see that harassment evolution causes extinction, if 
 
 u>1 and 1 ! r ! cc + k . (6) 
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Interestingly, this condition is independent of both the intrinsic birth rate b and of the 
scale µ of the density-dependent death rate. Inequality (6) shows that accelerating 
returns to males from investing in harassment (u>1) are needed for evolutionary 
suicide to occur. It also shows that the potential for evolutionary suicide critically 
depends on the costs of male harassment, both to males from expressing the trait (c) 
and to females from male-induced harm (k). If the ratio of male costs to female costs, 
c/(c+k), is less than the primary sex ratio r, then evolutionary suicide occurs, whereas 
if this ratio exceeds r, the population can persist. For an even primary sex ratio, r=1/2, 
the condition r>c/(c+k) simplifies to k>c, so the harm inflicted on females must 
exceed the cost males pay for harassment. 
 
We can understand these results by considering the effect of harassment on the 
relative densities of males and females. For u>1, the evolution of harassment may 
continue to accelerate, increasingly affecting the population densities of males and 
females. If r>c/(c+k), females suffer from more harassment-related mortality than 
males, which leads to greater harassment per female, as there are more males than 
females. This further increases female mortality, until the population is driven extinct. 
In contrast, if r<c/(c+k), males suffer from more harassment-related mortality than 
females, which decreases male density, and thus further reduces the per capita level of 
harassment females experience. 
 
These findings are confirmed by fig. 2, which shows how the evolutionarily singular 
level of harassment (fig. 2A) and the male and female density (fig. 2B) vary with the 
costs of harassment to males. We see that the population is driven to extinction for 
c<k. Low costs to males result in high levels of harassment, and thus extinction. High 
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costs to males enable population persistence, but decrease the density of males 
through their effect on male fitness. It is also interesting to observe that the greater the 
cost of harassment to males, the greater the density of females. This effect arises 
through a feedback between male density and the costs to males: if harassment 
increases male mortality, the lower resulting density of males creates conditions that 
are more favorable to females. Under an even primary sex ratio, the more females 
reproduce, the more even the OSR will be, and this, in turn, further reduces the harm 
inflicted on females. 
 
Evolution of Female Resistance 
In a second step of analysis, we can now look at the evolution of female resistance x 
(0!x"1) to male harassment. Following the assumptions described previously, the 
invasion fitness of a mutant female investing x' in a resident population investing x is 
 
  . (7) 
 
From equation (7), the selection gradient for x is thus given by 
 
  . (8) 
 
We can study the coevolution of male harassment and female resistance by examining 
the male and female selection gradients in equations (4) and (8). An example of the 
joint evolutionary dynamics of male harassment and female resistance, 
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d(x,y)/dt=!(sF(x,y),sM(x,y)), is given in fig. 3. Solving this for d(x*,y*)/dt=0, gives us 
the evolutionarily singular levels of female resistance x* and male harassment y*, 
 
 x* = 1a !
c 1! r( )
dkru  , (9a) 
 y* = bu d ! a( ) 1! r( )cd 1! u( )  . (9b) 
 
We can now use the threshold in inequality (2) to determine where evolution toward 
x* and y* imply population extinction. If we assume that the benefits of resistance are 
greater than the costs (i.e., a>d), sexual conflict drives the population extinct if 
 
 u>1 and 1 ! r > ac 1" u( )ac + dku " au c + k( )  . (10) 
 
In other words, greater values of a or k, or smaller values of c, will result in 
evolutionary suicide. As for the case of male harassment evolving in the absence of 
female resistance, more male-biased primary sex ratios (greater values of r) or more 
accelerating harassment benefits (greater values of u) will increase the extinction risk 
resulting from sexual conflict. 
 
Our results make intuitive sense as, if u>1, runaway selection for greater levels of 
sexual conflict may occur. If harassment is costly to males, this can prevent the OSR 
from becoming more biased: these costs prevent harassment from evolving toward the 
extinction threshold, not only because they directly hamper the evolution of strong 
(and thus costly) harassment, but also because the costs to males manifest themselves 
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as increases in male mortality. The reduction in male density resulting from the 
greater costs to males obviously limits the dangerous increase in the OSR. The 
opposite is true if the male-induced harm to females increases with k, as this 
magnifies the OSR bias. 
 
Fig. 4 shows how the evolution of female resistance depends on the cost to males of 
investing in harassment. We see that female resistance is favored at intermediate 
levels of the cost to males. If this cost is small, males evolve to be very harmful to 
females, so it does not pay to females to invest in resistance (Lee and Hays 2004). At 
the other extreme, high costs to males disfavor male harassment, and thus reduce the 
need for resistance. It is in the intermediate range that female resistance is 
evolutionarily favored. Fig. 4 shows that the evolution of female resistance can rescue 
the population from extinction in a significant part of the range 0!c"k we had 
previously shown to lead to population extinction in the absence of female resistance. 
 
Individual-based Model 
To check the robustness of results and relax the simplifying assumptions made in the 
analyses above, we now examine a genetically explicit individual-based model with 
diploid inheritance of harassment and resistance alleles. We consider one locus for 
harassment and one locus for resistance, and assume free recombination between 
these loci. We also assume additive genetics and the absence of environmental 
variation, so an offspring’s phenotype is the mid-parental value of the alleles inherited 
from the mother and the father. For example, the offspring’s resistance is 
x=(xF+xM)/2, where xF denotes the allelic value inherited from the mother and xM the 
allelic value inherited from the father. Sexual reproduction involves segregation and 
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recombination, and one of the parent’s two homologous alleles is chosen at random to 
be inherited. Each individual thus possesses two harassment alleles and two resistance 
alleles. The harassment alleles are only expressed in males, and the resistance alleles 
only in females. All other assumptions are as described above; in particular, we use 
the same functions to link phenotypes to per capita birth and death rates. Since 
populations in the individual-based model are finite, population dynamics are 
stochastic and evolution is subject to genetic drift. Full details of the individual-based 
model are given in Appendix 1. 
 
For c<k, and when harassment is not resisted by females, the population is driven 
extinct due to harassment evolution (fig. 5A and 5B). Our assumption of an even 
primary sex ratio results in a vicious circle in which males become more abundant as 
harassment shortens female lifespan, diminishing female density, and ultimately 
driving the population extinct. Allowing female resistance and male harassment to 
coevolve (fig. 5C and 5D) can prevent extinction. The two examples in fig. 5 reflect a 
general pattern. When examining 25 model runs when costs to males were low 
(c=0.8) and female resistance was not favored (a=1 and d=0), all 25 resulted in 
evolutionary suicide. When the costs to males were higher (c=1.2), the population 
persisted in 23 out of the 25 considered replicate model runs, with an average final 
population size of 971.52 ± 82.7 (mean ± S.E.) individuals. Allowing females to 
evolve resistance (for c=0.8, a=0.5, and d=1), persistence occurred in all 25 
considered replicate model runs, with an average final population size of 1770.6 ± 
17.5 (mean ± S.E.). All of these results are in good qualitative agreement with our 
analytical model. 
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Discussion 
Here we have shown that the evolution of male harassment can result in the extinction 
of an entire population. In our model, the evolution of male harassment can lead to a 
vicious circle in which fewer females survive while the mortality of the remaining 
females increases due to a high male-to-female ratio, until the population collapses. 
Our findings therefore confirm the results of Le Galliard et al. (2005). In particular, 
we have shown that an evolutionary ‘tragedy of the commons’ can occur both in a 
simplified analytical model and in a genetically explicit individual-based model. 
While earlier studies based on simpler models have speculated that sexual conflict 
may cause population extinction (for a review, see Kokko and Brooks 2003), our 
model is, to our knowledge, the first to confirm this effect whilst being explicit about 
the underlying population dynamics. 
 
Our analytical model highlights the importance of female-biased primary sex ratios as 
a mechanism that can limit the harm inflicted on females. However, a more important 
factor influencing extinction in our model is the ratio of male costs of harassment to 
male-induced harm to females. Under an even primary sex ratio, if investing in 
harassment is cheap for males and such harassment inflicts a large mortality cost on 
females, selection favors ever-greater levels of harassment. Elevated female mortality 
creates a male-biased operational sex ratio (OSR), which intensifies harassment and 
feeds back to increase female mortality even further, until the population is driven 
extinct. This is a fully expressed tragedy of the commons, as selection at no point 
turns to favor less harassing males as the shared resource (here the density of 
remaining females) diminishes. 
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The simplest way in which a tragedy of the commons can be averted is to make it 
costly for the exploiter (males) to exploit the resource (females), so harassing should 
be costly for males. Harassment is costly for males when competition among males 
and/or the pursuit of females for copulation implies higher mortality, increased 
predation risk, elevated energy requirements, or reduced time available for performing 
other functions. Thus, if a strong trade-off exists between the benefits males get from 
harassing, in terms of extra matings, and the costs of obtaining those matings, it will 
be advantageous for males to reduce harassment, which is likely to prevent extinction. 
The extent to which harassment is costly will depend very much on the mating 
system, but our model predicts that a tragedy of the commons through sexual conflict 
is likely if harassment is cheap for males, but costly to females. 
 
An interesting result of our analysis is that if male costs of harassment exceed those 
inflicted on females, more male-induced harm actually increases population density, 
despite causing the sexual conflict to intensify. This occurs because conflict in this 
case elevates male mortality more than female mortality, and removing males can 
increase population growth via density dependence when males and females utilize 
the same resources (e.g. Wedekind 2002; Kokko and Brooks 2003; Rankin and Kokko 
2007). In addition, the shape of the relationship between the benefits and costs of 
harassment to males could play a large role in promoting or inhibiting extinction. For 
example, decelerating costs to males might select for runaway evolution to greater 
levels of male harassment, thus favoring extinction, while accelerating costs are 
expected to have the opposite effect. 
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Coevolutionary dynamics occur under a wide range of circumstances, such as 
between predators and their prey and parasites and their hosts (Dieckmann et al. 1995; 
van der Laan and Hogeweg 1995; Dieckmann and Law 1996; Gilchrist and Sasaki 
2002), as well as between male harassment and female resistance (Arnqvist and Rowe 
2002; Wigby and Chapman 2004; Rönn et al. 2007; Godsen and Svensson 2009). We 
have established conditions under which the coevolution of female resistance with 
male harassment can prevent extinction. Adaptations in females that counter harm 
caused by males results in less damage to females, thus increasing overall female 
fitness and a greater population density (fig. 4). Coevolutionary dynamics are 
influenced by the speed at which different traits can evolutionarily respond to changes 
in other traits (e.g., host-parasite dynamics are strongly influenced by the typically 
faster life cycles of the parasite). If the harming sex evolves faster than the harmed 
sex, extinction could occur under a wider range of circumstances than observed in our 
model. Conversely, if females can resist males by plastically reducing their mating 
rate (Lessells 2005), the harm to females is reduced, potentially preventing extinction. 
 
Our models obviously do not consider all mechanisms that may conceivably prevent 
extinction through sexual conflict. For instance, group structure can disfavor male 
harassment (Eldakar et al. 2009; Rankin 2011). Although we considered the feedback 
between sex-specific mortality and the per capita harassment experienced by females, 
our model has not explored all potential forms of feedback between demography and 
conflict. There are many other feedbacks that make selection a function of population 
characteristics such as density (Dieckmann and Metz 2006; Kokko and López-
Sepulcre 2007), and such feedbacks can potentially resolve conflicts (Kokko and 
Rankin 2006; Rankin 2007; Knell 2009). However, since sexual selection on males 
!! #+!
can either intensify or relax with increasing density (Kokko and Rankin 2006; Klug et 
al. 2010), we based our model on the assumption of no change (the null case in the 
absence of any specific information) and instead focused on density-dependent shifts 
in the OSR. In nature, predicting even just the direction of such shifts is far from 
obvious. If conflict intensified at lower population densities (Kokko and Rankin 
2006), this would increase the risk of evolutionary suicide. Any mechanism that 
favors male over female survival in low-density conditions (e.g., if males dominate 
females behaviorally during and after a population crash) could have this effect. On 
the other hand, there are conditions in which the mechanism we envisage to cause 
vicious circles will not apply as efficiently as we have assumed. OSRs can differ from 
primary sex ratios whether or not breeding is continuous, but any effects of male 
harassment are probably weaker with discrete generations than with overlapping 
generations (as modeled here), because in the former case each generation starts again 
with a roughly even primary sex ratio. 
 
Conclusions 
Male harassment can increase female mortality (Arnqvist and Rowe 2005) and female 
mortality often is a strong determinant of equilibrium population densities (Rankin 
and Kokko 2007; Candolin and Heuschele 2008). Our model shows that, through the 
vulnerability implied by this relationship, male harassment can cause a tragedy of the 
commons, and even result in a population being driven extinct. We have shown how 
this tragedy can be averted through the costs to males of investing in harassment, and 
the coevolution of male harassment and female resistance. In addition, any 
individually selected trait that can result in local population extinction is subject to 
contravening selection at higher evolutionary levels (Rankin et al. 2007b). If sexual 
!! #"!
conflict frequently impairs a population’s reproduction and viability, such higher-
level selection may be an important factor limiting the intensities of male harassment 
we observe in nature. 
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Appendix 1: Individual-based model 
To test the robustness of our analytical model, we built an individual-based model to 
examine how our results are affected by introducing demographic stochasticity and an 
explicit genetic system, namely diploid, additive genetics. In our individual-based 
model, the population can have any distribution of trait values, and there is no 
assumption that all but one trait value should be rare. The model assumes diploid 
inheritance of harassment and resistance alleles at two freely recombining loci. An 
individual thus possesses two harassment alleles, one inherited from the father, the 
other from the mother. We further assume additive genetics (i.e., no dominance or 
epistasis), so the harassment trait is given by the arithmetic mean of the two 
!! ##!
harassment alleles. The harassment trait is only expressed in males; analogous rules 
apply to the resistance trait only expressed in females. 
 
The individual-based model is initialized with a population of 400 individuals, 
randomly designated as either male or female. Each allele at each locus is drawn at 
random. To ensure sufficient variation in the traits, male harassment alleles (which 
can take any positive value) are drawn from a random exponential distribution with a 
mean of 1, while female resistance alleles (which can take values between 0 and 1) 
are drawn from a random uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Males express the 
harassment trait y=(yM+yF)/2, where yM denotes the harassment allele inherited from 
the male and yF the harassment allele inherited from the female. Females express the 
resistance trait x=(xM+xF)/2, where xM denotes the resistance allele inherited from the 
male and xF the resistance allele inherited from the female. For each trait, one of each 
parent’s alleles is chosen at random to be inherited to the diploid offspring. We use 
the same functions to describe per capita birth and death rates as in the analytic 
model. The birth rate of a given female is thus given by b(1–ax), and the death rate of 
a given female by (1–dx)(k M/F)+#(M+F). We assume that all individuals mate 
sufficiently frequently, so females experience the same level of male harassment , 
given by the population average of all harassment traits y expressed by males. The 
death rate of a given male is given by cy+#(M+F). We assume that the relative mating 
success of males is proportional to their mating ability yu. 
 
The model keeps track of birth and death events, which occur in continuous time. 
Each individual female has a unique birth rate and death rate, while males express 
!! #$!
death rates only. The next event that occurs in the population is chosen with a 
probability proportional to its rate. If the event is a death, the chosen individual is 
removed from the population. If it is a birth, a father is chosen with a probability 
proportional to his mating ability yu and is mated with the chosen mother. The 
resultant offspring inherits one randomly chosen resistance allele and harassment 
allele from each parent. With probability r the offspring is male, while with 
probability 1–r it is female. The model is iterated for 500,000 events, or until the 
population is driven extinct. The reported examples use parameter values r=1/2, b=20, 
µ=0.001, k=1, and u=1.01, and we change the cost c of male harassment, and the cost 
a and benefit d of female resistance.
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Figure and Table Legends 
Table 1. Model variables and parameters. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of male harassment (A and C) and implications for the 
population densities of males and females (B and D) in the analytical model. Panels A 
and B show a case without selection-driven extinction (c=1.2), whereas panels C and 
D show a case with evolutionary suicide (c=0.8). Other parameters: r=1/2, b=50, µ=1, 
k=1, u=1.01, a=1, d=0, x=0, and !=0.01. 
 
Figure 2: Influence of harassment cost to males on the evolutionary equilibrium of 
male harassment (A) and the resultant equilibrium densities of males and females (B) 
in the analytical model. The dashed line shows the equilibrium density of males and 
females in the absence of male harassment (y=0) and female resistance (x=0). 
Parameters: r=1/2, b=50, µ=1, k=1, u=1.01, a=1, d=0, and x=0. 
 
Figure 3: Coevolution of male harassment and female resistance (A) and implications 
for the population densities of males and females (B) in the analytical model. 
Parameters: r=1/2, b=50, µ=1, u=1.01, k=1, a=1/2, d=1, c=0.8, and !=0.01. 
 
Figure 4: Influence of harassment cost to males on the evolutionary equilibrium of 
male harassment and female resistance (A) and the resultant equilibrium densities of 
males and females (B) in the analytical model. The dashed line shows the equilibrium 
density of males and females in the absence of male harassment (y=0) and female 
resistance (x=0). Parameters: r=1/2, b=50, µ=1, k=1, u=1.01, a=1/2, and d=1. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of male harassment (A and C) and implications for the 
population sizes of males and females (B and D) in two model runs of the individual-
based model. In panels A and B female resistance could not evolve (x=0), whereas in 
panels C and D it could coevolve together with male harassment (a=0.5 and d=1). 
Other parameters: r=1/2, b=20, µ=0.001, k=1, u=1.01, and c=0.8. !
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Table 1. Model variables and parameters 
  Description 
Variable  
 M Density of males 
 F Density of females 
 y' and y Level of male harassment for a mutant (y') and a resident (y) 
 x' and x Level of female resistance for a mutant (x') and a resident (x) 
Parameter  
 r Primary sex ratio (proportion of males) 
 b Intrinsic birth rate 
 µ Scale of density-dependent death rate 
 c Cost to males of investing into harassment 
 k Cost to females of experiencing harassment 
 u Shape of returns to males from investing into harassment 
 a Cost to females of resisting harassment 
 d Efficiency of female resistance in reducing the costs of male harassment 
 !
